Fico is King and the King is back!

Since the early 90’s your Fico score has been a standard component of home lending decisions in the United States.  Fico became less significant during the ever increasing property values of the 2000’s as the rise in property values served to get many borrowers out of trouble with their payment obligations.  As everyone now knows, that house of cards/or unabashed risk has come crashing down.

 

Did Fico tell the story?

 

You need only glance at this attached graph to see the answer.  The odds of a borrower becoming delinquent on their mortgage go up over 100 times from a sub 600 score to a 700+ score.  That is huge!  Now the banks are looking at this data with renewed interest.

 

Even with FHA which basically doesn’t acknowledge Fico in their qualifying by allowing “delegated” underwriters to decision borrowers manually irrespective of the score are finding little opportunity for borrowers with sub- 600 Fico’s.  Why?  It is due to the systemic roadblocks (see last weeks post).  Major lenders are simply refusing to accept these borrowers which make FHA’s desire to provide financing to those that might otherwise qualify irrelevant.

 

Curious contradiction.

 I find myself puzzled by the telegraphing being done by the industry which suggests that a borrower need be in default before they can receive attention from Loss Mitigation and default prevention opportunities given the fact that by doing so you will destroy your chances for a new loan as your all important Fico will be adversely impaired.  Fannie Mae’s own guidance suggests “At least two full monthly payments of principal and interest (P&I), taxes, and insurance (or P&I only if taxes and insurance are not escrowed) are due and unpaid”, before you qualify for help. So here we have a landscape where you will likely need to destroy your credit worthiness in order to receive the interest rate reprieve some most desperately need regardless of your intent.  

That is truly a shame!

 FICO credit bureau risk scores made available at all three major US credit reporting agencies — BEACONsm at Equifax, EMPIRICA® at Trans Union, and the Experian/Fair Isaac model at Experian. (1991)

DFico Chart

 

Fico Graph

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No Hope for Homeowners

Why Government programs to help homeowners don't work.

To understand the breakdown you have to understand the existing structure through which a loan get's done.  This attachment illustrates the process a loan needs to go through to ultimately get funded. The governments desire to provide financing to borrowers in distress or even the appetite of investors to own those loans mean very little unless every step in the process is willing to participate.  One missing step will derail the whole strategy. 

Currently, the major banks through which their retail loan centers, independent brokers and smaller interim banks rely as a necessary step in the funding process do not have any desire to fund and own the responsibility of collecting the payments from borrowers that are clearly in distress.  Even though the "Loan" amount is ultimately guaranteed by Fannie, Freddie or FHA. The responsibility for the payment collections fall squarely on these major banks.  Due to current rising default rates, the banks simply do not want the added work-load, risk and upfront cost associated with borrowers that have displayed a pattern of not paying their mortgage.  Regardless of the reason. 

Can you blame them?   

I must admit, I felt very frustrated when “Hope for Homeowners” was first introduced last October.  We, as a fully delegated FHA lender professed at working with distressed borrowers through successful write-down negotiations and Loan Modification activities, were inundated with borrower requests for this product.  We were anxiously anticipating a windfall of business opportunity when the guidelines were first released.  As I called my contacts at all of the large Institutional Lenders on which we all rely to sell our loans I was met with zero interest in cooperating with the program.  Out of frustration, I went toe to toe with one of the major investors at the Mortgage Bankers meeting in San Francisco where I even brought up the fact that they had just received Billions in TARP money and weren’t going to use any of it for the Hope for Homeowners program when this gentleman said something to me that stopped me in my tracks. 

He said, If we would agree to buy these loans from you where you are on the hook for the borrowers first 4 payments, the typical timeframe for a mortgage bank, or you would have to buy the loan back…what would you do?    Admittedly…I am no longer an advocate for the program. 

What the government needs to do the next time they decide to spend all of the time and money to come up with a program to help homeowners is apply a little discovery to the systemics of actually originating and funding these loans.  They might also do well to get the Major Banks to “sign off” on the program and agree to some level of support.  The Hope for Homeowners program should have included a “First payment default” guarantee and money earmarked for the servicing of these loans.  Then, it might have had a chance.

Flow Chart 

Media Contact:
Rick Arvielo
President of New American Funding
1-800-426-5626
http://www.newamericandirect.com/

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